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ECOWAS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND 
SECURITY: PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 
Elkanah Oluwapelumi Babatunde* 
Abstract: The United Nations (UN) Charter remains the primary instrument for the 
international regulation of the use of force. However, there are emerging trends in practice, 
especially by regional organizations, which may be leading to the establishment of a new 
customary international law rule on pro-democratic intervention. Thus, it is necessary to 
examine the legality and compatibility of these practices with the UN Charter and other 
international and regional instruments. It is also important to investigate opinio juris in order 
to establish whether the international community interprets these practices as a breach of 
existing international law or indeed as creating new law. This article analyses the 
permissibility of pro-democratic intervention in light of article 2(4) of the UN Charter, the 
principle of non-intervention, and other rules guiding the use of force in international law, 
with a focus on the recent ECOWAS intervention in the Gambia and its consistency with the 
general body of international law. The article concludes that, albeit illegal, the ECOWAS 
intervention is legitimate and morally excusable following Reisman’s morally-based 
approach to humanitarian intervention. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations (UN) Charter came into force at the end of the Second World War in 
1945.1 It affirms the commitment of the nations of the world to international peace and 
security.2 In furtherance of this objective, article 2(4) of the UN Charter expressly bans the 
use of force in all its forms by states against each other. However, the Charter provides for 
certain exceptions to this provision: the right to individual and collective self-defence3 and 
the exercise of Chapter VII powers by the UN Security Council.4  
In a series of events between the Economic Community of West African States 
(‘ECOWAS’) and the Republic of Gambia (‘Gambia’), ECOWAS intervened in Gambia both 
politically and militarily. This intervention was in clear breach of article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter and has called into question a number of international law principles regulating the 
use of force.  
In this article, I address the ECOWAS intervention in line with the general body of 
international law on the use of force. This article analyses the actions of ECOWAS as a 
regional organisation under the UN Charter as opposed to the actions of individual member 																																																								
*PhD Candidate, University of Cape Town. Special thanks to Dr Cathy Powell, Lorraine Aboagye and the UCL 
editorial team for comments on the initial drafts of this paper. 
 
1 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI 
(UNC). 
2 ibid art 1. 
3 ibid art 51. 
4 ibid art 42. 
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states. Although ECOWAS is not a party to the UN Charter, it is nevertheless bound by some 
of the rules contained therein, including the prohibition of the use of force which has become 
part of customary international law. The obligations of ECOWAS under the Charter are 
therefore to be understood in their customary international law form.5 The article opens with 
a brief background of the facts that led to the ECOWAS intervention in Gambia. In the next 
section, I analyse article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the prohibition on the use of force. I 
argue that the intervention contravenes the provisions of the UN Charter. Mindful of the 
powers of the Security Council to authorise the use of force, I proceed in section D to discuss 
Security Council Resolution 2337 and whether it constitutes a valid legal authority upon 
which ECOWAS could have intervened in Gambia. A look at this resolution reveals that it 
did not in any way authorise the use of force by ECOWAS. I further discuss the retroactive 
effect of Security Council resolutions and conclude that the Security Council resolution in 
question does not have any retroactive effect. 
In section E, I discuss the principle of consent and intervention by invitation in 
relation to the prohibition on the use of force in international law. I examine the plea of the 
newly elected president of Gambia, Adama Barrow, at his inaugural speech. In light of the 
conditions regarding authority to give consent on behalf of a state, and the timing of the 
ECOWAS intervention, I conclude that the ECOWAS intervention was not supported by 
valid consent from Gambia.  
In the absence of any justification for the intervention in the UN Charter, I briefly 
examine the right of democratic governance in section F. Democratic governance, simply 
stated, refers to governance based on the lawful consent of the governed.6 This article argues 
that while there is an emerging right of democratic governance, the legality of pro-democratic 
intervention to enforce this right is yet to be established in international law. There is a 
scarceness of state practice to support the existence of customary international law permitting 
such an intervention. Furthermore, opinio juris remains divided and we are far from reaching 
a consensus recognising the permissibility of pro-democratic interventions. Thus, the 
intervention of ECOWAS was a clear derogation from established principles of international 
law. 
In section G, I address the ECOWAS intervention in the light of the ‘illegal but 
legitimate’ conceptual framework. I adopt the argument of Reisman that given the 																																																								
5  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) 
(Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, [188]–[192]. 
6 Thomas Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ (1992) 86(1) AJIL 46, 46. 
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ineffectiveness of the collective security system, states may resort to force due to a 
compelling moral need to respond to certain crisis and argue that certain uses of non-
defensive force may be legitimate even in the absence of a Security Council resolution. There 
are situations where a timely intervention could prevent an imminent humanitarian 
catastrophe before it escalates and at very little financial and political cost. The use of force 
in such cases even though illegal is legitimate and morally excusable. The ECOWAS 
intervention in Gambia is one of such cases.  
 
B. BACKGROUND 
ECOWAS deployed troops against Gambia in January 2017 in response to the democratic 
crisis that had begun to erupt in the country after the 2016 presidential elections. Priorly, 
Yahya Jammeh, who gained power in a bloodless coup in 1994, had ruled Gambia and had 
remained in power until January 2017 winning all presidential elections from then until 2011. 
On 1 December 2016, Jammeh lost the presidential elections to Adama Barrow, the leader of 
the Coalition Party in what was widely agreed to be a free and fair election.7 In a twist of 
events, Jammeh, who had earlier accepted the results of the election, subsequently rejected 
the results and accused the electoral officers of falsifying the election results.8 Jammeh filed 
an action in the Supreme Court of Gambia challenging the election results. Nevertheless, the 
President-elect, Adama Barrow was sworn in as President of Gambia on 19 January 2017 at 
the Gambian embassy in Senegal.9 Upon taking the oath of office, Barrow made a request to 
ECOWAS, the African Union (‘AU’) and the UN Security Council to support the people of 
Gambia in enforcing and installing the democratically elected government.10 ECOWAS 
troops entered into Gambia immediately after the inauguration of Adama Barrow as 
President. Yahya Jammeh stepped down from office on 21 January 2017.  
It may seem on the face of it that the deployment of forces against Gambia 
contravenes article 2(4) of the UN Charter. However, it may be argued that this intervention 																																																								
7 Dennis Foretia, ‘Gambia’s elections give hope for Africa’s democracies’ The Washington Post (Washington 
DC, 8 December 2016) <www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2016/12/08/gambias-elections-
give-hope-for-africas-democracies/?utm_term=.a1a183b69304> accessed 2 July 2017. 
8 Ricci Shryock, ‘Gambian President Shows No Sign of Leaving Office after Election Defeat’, Voice of America 
(Washington DC, 5 January 2017) <www.voanews.com/a/gambia-president-election-defeat/3664236.html> 
accessed 2 July 2017. 
9 ‘Al Jazeera, ‘Adama Barrow sworn in as Gambia’s president in Senegal’ Al-Jazeera (Doha, 19 January 2017) 
<www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/gambia-president-adama-barrow-takes-oath-senegal-
170119170745954.html?> accessed 4 July 2017. 
10 Ruth Maclean, ‘Troops enter the Gambia after Adama Barrow is inaugurated in Senegal’ The Guardian 
(London, 19 January 2017) <www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/19/new-gambian-leader-adama-barrow-
sworn-in-at-ceremony-in-senegal> accessed 18 June 2017. 
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is permissible on a number of grounds, including the plea made by Adama Barrow at his 
inauguration. It is however necessary to take a closer look at the facts surrounding the 
deployment in line with the provisions of the UN Charter and customary international law in 
order to assert whether it conforms with established international law standards.	 Does the 
request by Adama Barrow as part of an inaugural speech constitute consent to use force? Was 
Barrow the right authority at that time to give consent for force to be used on Gambian 
territory? Did Resolution 2337 of the Security Council have retroactive effect which 
legitimizes the intervention? Or has pro-democratic intervention become established as a 
principle of customary international law? This article seeks to address these questions by 
looking at the UN Charter and state practice since 1945. 
 
C. THE UN CHARTER AND THE USE OF FORCE 
The UN Charter came into force in 1945 upon its ratification by the five permanent members 
of the Security Council.11 The Charter culminated an age-long attempt at the regulation of the 
use of force in international relations.12 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter provides that ‘[a]ll 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.’  
The UN Charter prohibits the unilateral use of force by states and self-proclaimed 
coalition of states.13 It pre-empts that states engage in armed conflict without acknowledging 
the existence of war by providing for a general prohibition against the use of force.14 The UN 
Charter thus revolutionises pre-Charter law on the use of force by going beyond war to 
prohibit all uses of force even where a state of war has not been declared. It is believed that 
international peace and security is best maintained when the use of force by states is kept to 
the barest minimum and the political independence and territorial integrity of a state is 
respected and not interfered with.15 
In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United 
States of America), 16  the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) noted that prohibited 																																																								
11 UNC, art 110(3). 
12 Randall Lesaffer, ‘Too Much History: From War as Sanction to the Sanctioning of War’ in Marc Weller (ed), 
The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (OUP 2015) 35. 
13 Robert Kolb and Richard Hyde, An Introduction to the International Law of Armed Conflicts (Hart Publishing 
2008) 11. 
14  ibid; Olivier Corten, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary 
International Law (Hart Publishing 2010) 52. 
15 Malcolm Shaw, International Law (6th edn, CUP 2008) 213. 
16 Nicaragua v United States of America (n 5). 
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intervention only applies to matters over which the state has the sovereign jurisdiction to 
decide upon.17 In other words, the subject matter giving rise to an unlawful intervention must 
be within the state’s exclusive jurisdiction. The Court went further to enumerate some 
matters, including the choice of political system, as matters within the state’s sovereign 
jurisdiction, stating that any intervention therewith would be unlawful. 18  Inasmuch as 
intervention is prohibited in these matters, it is also impermissible to use force vis-à-vis 
issues for which intervention is prohibited.19 The principle of non-intervention forms the 
overall principle under which the prohibition on the use of force and other forms of coercion 
such as economic and diplomatic sanctions are based.20 It restricts the ability of external 
bodies to meddle economically, politically or in any way whatsoever in the internal affairs of 
a state. In other words, the prohibition on the use of force instantiates the principle of non-
intervention. 
The UN Charter expressly provides for three exceptions to the prohibition of the use 
of force. First, it exempts the use of force against former enemy states of the Second World 
War. This exception became obsolete with the admission of the states in question to the 
United Nations.  Secondly, it permits enforcement action by the Security Council in line with 
its powers enshrined in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The third exception is the right of 
states to self-defence enshrined in article 51. The Charter recognises and upholds the right of 
states to individual and collective self-defence.21 Thus, a state will be acting within its rights 
and within the ambit of the law if it uses force against another state to defend itself against an 
armed attack. Any measure taken in self-defence must be reported to the UN Security 
Council.22 It is necessary to add that the use of force in the territory of a state is permissible if 
the state has consented to the deployment of forces.23 Beyond these exceptions, every other 
use of force is centralized into the hands of the Security Council for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
1. Use of force and regional arrangements for peace 
Article 52 of the UN Charter provides that regional arrangements directed towards the 
maintenance of international peace and security are not precluded by it. The role of regional 
organizations was acknowledged in the Recommendations of the UN Special Committee on 																																																								
17 ibid [205]. 
18 ibid. 
19 ibid. 
20 UNGA Res 20/2131 (21 December 1965) UN Doc A/RES/20/2131, Preamble, operative para 2. 
21 UNC, art 51. 
22 ibid. 
23 See later discussion in section E. 
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Peacekeeping Operations.24 It is permissible for a regional organisation, such as ECOWAS, 
to employ whatever measures it deems necessary and appropriate to ensure international 
peace and security within its region.25 However, these measures must not include military 
action.26 Article 53 of the UN Charter does not affect the monopoly of the Security Council 
over the use of non-defensive force.27 A literal interpretation of the provisions of article 53 of 
the UN Charter reveals that a regional organisation cannot embark on enforcement action 
until the approval of the UN Security Council for such action has been obtained.28 Thus, even 
though regional arrangements could be made for the maintenance of peace and security, 
regional organisations are in a subordinate position to the Security Council with respect to the 
use of force.29 In other words, while regional arrangements for international peace and 
security are permissible under the Charter, the Security Council must authorise such 
arrangements if  military action is involved.30 
2. The prohibition against the threat of force 
It is noteworthy that the UN Charter not only prohibits the actual use of force but also the 
threat of force against a state.31 In its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons,32 the ICJ held that states must refrain from both the use of and the threat 
of using force.33 International law proscribes any form of interference or attempted threat 
against a state or its political, economic or cultural components.34  
What constitutes a threat prohibited under Article 2(4)? The ICJ has held that the 
existence of a threat to use force depends upon various factors.35 First, there must be an 
express intention to use force against a particular state if certain demands are not met.36 The 
threat of force hinges on the promise to use force.37 Thus, mere schisms or suspicions 
between states, without a declared intention to deploy force, do not constitute threat of use of 																																																								
24 Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on 
Peacekeeping Operations’ (2005), UN Doc A/60/64 [29]. 
25 UNC, art 52. 
26 ibid art 53. 
27 Ugo Villani, ‘The Security Council’s Authorization of Enforcement Action by Regional Organizations’ in 
J.A. Frowein and R Wolfrum (eds), MPYUNL (Vol 6, Kluwer 2002) 552. 
28 UNC, art 53; Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the 
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v UK) (Preliminary Objection) [1998] ICJ Rep 9 [44], [38]. 
29 Villani (n 27) 537. 
30 UNC, art 53. 
31 ibid art 2(4). 
32 [1996] ICJ Rep 226. 
33 ibid; Nicaragua v United States (n 5) [227]. 
34 Ved Nanda, ‘The Validity of United States Intervention in Panama under International Law’ (1990) 84(2) 
AJIL Law 495. 
35 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (n 32) [47]. 
36 ibid. 
37 Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Clarendon Press 1963) 364. 
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force under article 2(4) of the UN Charter. In addition, the threat of force must be directed 
towards a specific reaction on the part of the targeted state and accompanied by coercive 
intent.38 There must be a stated course of action which the ‘aggressor’ wants the threatened 
state to adopt and hopes to compel the state by the threat of force. The threat and the demand 
should be clear and directed at an identified state or group of states.39 A general statement to 
use force not directed to a particular or identifiable state or group of states does not amount to 
a threat of force. Thus, to constitute a threat prohibited under the Charter, there must be intent 
to use force; certain demands must be made and these must be directed at a particular state or 
group of states. 
The threat of force is illegal in a situation where the actual use of force would also be 
illegal.40 The UN Charter prohibits the threat of force in the same way it prohibits the actual 
use of force.41 Thus, it would only be illegal to threaten force in a situation where its actual 
use would be illegal.42 Threats of force targeted towards a matter within a state’s domestic 
jurisdiction would therefore be in contravention of international law. The ICJ has held that it 
is impermissible to threaten force against a state in order to compel it to adopt a certain 
political or economic position.43 These are matters within the state’s sovereign jurisdiction 
and coercive external influence in these areas are unjustified. Examples of legal threats of 
force would include threats in matters for which the Security Council has given approval to 
use force or threat pursuant to the exercise of the right to self-defence. Otherwise, threats to 
use force would be impermissible under international law. Threats to use force may include 
rearmaments, military manoeuvres, the establishment of military bases on the territory of a 
foreign state, bellicose declarations, concentration of troops along borders, and general 
mobilisation and propaganda in favour of a war of aggression.44    
On December 23, 2016, the President of ECOWAS stated that a deadline had been 
given to Jammeh to step down as president of Gambia, failing which, troops ‘already on 
alert’ would intervene to topple the Jammeh-led government.45 This unequivocal demand 																																																								
38 Bruno Simma and others (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, vol 1(OUP 2012) 219. 
39 Francois Dubuisson and Anne Lagerwall, ‘Too Much History: From War as Sanction to the Sanctioning of 
War’ in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (OUP 2015) 913. 
40 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (n 32) [47]. 
41 Dubuisson and Lagerwall (n 39) 910. 
42 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (n 32).  
43 ibid. 
44 Dubuisson and Lagerwall (n 39) 913. 
45 Adam Withnall, ‘West African Bloc Threatens to Invade Gambia if Incumbent Jammeh Refuses to Give Up 
Power’ The Independent (London, 23 December 2016) <www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/gambia-
election-yahya-jammeh-west-african-bloc-ecowas-senegal-invasion-military-a7492966.html> accessed 18 June 
2017. 
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made by ECOWAS, supported by a threat that troops were to be deployed against Gambia, 
amounted to a threat of use of force. There was a clear demand, namely the request that 
Jammeh steps down as president. Further, the demand regarded a matter within the sovereign 
jurisdiction of Gambia:46 electoral matters are political and fall within a state’s sovereign 
jurisdiction.47 There was also coercive intent:48 the troops to be used for actualizing the threat 
were already on alert.49 ECOWAS had effectively issued, as of December 23, 2016, a threat 
to use force against Gambia in violation of international law. This threat materialised on 19 
January 2017 with the deployment of 7,000 troops into Gambian territory upon Jammeh’s 
refusal to step down from office.50 
 
D. THE GAMBIAN INTERVENTION AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
Given the illegality of the use of force in regional arrangements for peace, Security Council 
authorisation remains the most compelling argument for intervention in the Gambian case.51 
The UN Charter empowers the Security Council to determine the existence of a threat to 
international peace and security and take the necessary measures to restore same.52 The 
Council is further empowered under article 42 of the UN Charter to authorise use of military 
action where such becomes necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Hence, military intervention is permissible if it has prior and explicit approval of the Security 
Council.53 The Charter does not define when there is a threat to or breach of peace or an act 
of aggression. It leaves the determination on the existence of such circumstances to the 
discretion of the Security Council.54 It must also be stated that there are no settled legal 
criteria for determining the existence of a threat55 – the Security Council is expected to 
approach each case on its own merits. On those discretionary grounds, when the Council 																																																								
46 Nicaragua v United States (n 5) [205]. 
47 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (n 32) [47]. 
48 Simma and others (n 38) 219. 
49 Withnall (n 45). 
50 Bryony Jones and others, ‘Gambia: Defeated Leader Yahya Jammeh Leaves Country after Election Loss’ 
CNN (Atlanta, 20 January 2017) <edition.cnn.com/2017/01/20/Africa/gambia-janmeh-barrow-
ecowas/index.html> accessed 2 July 2017; Ismail Akwei, ‘Senegalese Troops Enter The Gambia as UN Backs 
ECOWAS Intervention’ Africa News (Pointe-Noire, 19 January 2017) 
<www.africanews.com/2017/01/19/senegalese-troops-enter-the-gambia-as-un-backs-ecowas-intervention//> 
accessed 18 June 2017. 
51 UNC, arts 39–42. 
52 ibid art 39.  
53 Joel Westra, International Law and the Use of Armed Force: The UN Charter and the Major Powers 
(Routledge 2007) 6. 
54 UNC, art 39; Sydney Bailey, The Procedure of the UN Security Council (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 1988) 
295. 
55 Jean D’Aspremont, ‘The Collective Security System’ in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford Handbook of the Use 
of Force in International Law (OUP 2015) 147. 
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finds the crisis in a state to constitute a threat to international peace and security, it bears the 
authority to authorise the use of military force.56  
However, the Council may only authorise military intervention if non-military means 
would be or have already been proven to be inadequate.57 Recourse must first be made to 
pacific means of settling the issues before recourse to armed force is considered.58 Beyond 
the requirement that non-military means should be considered before employing military 
force, the UN Charter does not contain any more detailed rules guiding the exercise of the 
Council’s Chapter VII powers.59 As already stated, the decision remains within the Council’s 
sole discretion.60  
Notably, the Security Council has tended to intervene in situations which claim to 
constituting a threat to international peace and security is weak.61 In 1994, the Security 
Council decided that the overthrow of a democratic government in Haiti constituted a threat 
to international peace and security and authorised the use of force to restore democracy.62 
The Security Council also authorised the deployment of forces in support of Cote d’Ivoire to 
ensure a peaceful democratic process.63 Other examples where the Security Council has 
intervened include the suppression of the internal crisis in Iraq,64 the protection of food aid in 
Somalia,65 the suppression of ethnic war in Bosnia,66 and the intervention in Libya against the 
government of Muammar Gaddafi.67 Although the Security Council took the cross-border 
effect of these crises into account in reaching these decisions, they were arguably short of 
amounting to a threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression constituting a threat to 
																																																								
56 Judy Gallant, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Security Council Resolution 688: A Reappraisal in Light of a 
Changing World Order’ (1992) 7(4) Am U Intl L Rev 881. 
57 UNC, art 42. 
58 Niels Blokker, ‘Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the UN Security Council to 
Authorize the Use of Force by ‘Coalitions of the Able and Willing’ (2000) 11 EJIL 550. 
59 ibid. 
60 D’Aspremont (n 55) 147. 
61 ibid; Karsten Nowrott and Emily W Schebacker, ‘The Use of Force to Restore Democracy: International 
Legal Implications of the ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone’ (1998) 14 Am U Intl L Rev 354. 
62 UNSC Res 940 (31 July 1994) UN Doc S/RES/940. 
63 UNSC Res 1528 (27 February 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1528.  
64 UNSC Res 688 (05 April 1991) UN Doc S/RES/688; UNSC Res 689 (09 April 1991) UN Doc S/RES/689. 
The intervention referred to here is different from the one pertaining to Kuwait. Some scholars have argued that 
this resolution did not authorise military intervention. For a full discussion of the Kurdish crisis and exercise of 
Chapter VII powers, see Schachter, 'United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict’ (1991) 85 AJIL 452; Peter 
Malanczuk, ‘The Kurdish Crisis and Allied Intervention in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf War’ (1991) 2 
EJIL 128, 128–129; Gallant (n 50) 881. 
65 UNSC Res 733 (23 January 1992) UN Doc S/RES/733. 
66 UNSC Res 941 (23 September 1994) UN Doc S/RES/941. 
67 UNSC Res 1973 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973. 
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international peace and security.68 Once there is a significant level of internal crisis, the 
Security Council may consider that it has sufficient potential transboundary effect and 
interfere in such crisis.69 A Security Council resolution to intervene in Gambia would not 
have been unprecedented on these grounds. 
Markedly, ECOWAS did not seem to be making any progress in the negotiations with 
Jammeh. The erstwhile president had maintained his stand to not step down from office even 
after the winner of the elections had been sworn in at the Gambian embassy in Senegal. He 
had in addition declared a state of emergency. Jammeh had maintained a position that showed 
that non-military means were inadequate to address the situation. Barrow on the other hand 
showed no sign of letting go of his election victory and was sworn into office in Senegal, thus 
creating a nation with two individuals claiming to be the legitimate head of state. This, 
coupled with the movement of thousands of Gambians into neighbouring Senegal, shows that 
there was a real emergency. The imminent character of violence lent reason to the Security 
Council to intervene and authorise the use of force. An exercise of the Council’s powers 
under Article 42 would thus be justified under the foregoing considerations. 
However, the deployment of troops against Gambia was carried out without a 
Security Council resolution. Although the Security Council later passed Resolution 2337 
(2017), this merely endorsed ‘the decisions of ECOWAS and the AU to recognize Barrow as 
President of the Gambia.’70 The resolution did not go further to authorise military action. In 
fact, paragraph 9 of the resolution expressly requests all stakeholders to exercise restraint and 
ensure the peaceful transfer of power. The use of the words ‘peaceful transfer of power’ puts 
to rest any doubt with regards to the intention of the Security Council to authorise force 
against Gambia. The representatives of Russia and Egypt went further to make it clear that 
the Resolution did not invoke the Chapter VII powers of the Council and that it was instead a 
call for peaceful resolution of the democratic crisis in Gambia.71  
1. Retroactive application of the Security Council resolution 2337 
Even if it were conceded for the sake of discussion that said resolution authorised the use of 
force, its validity would remain doubtful on the basis that the legality of retroactive 
authorisations is, at least, contentious. Retroactive endorsements of the use of force by the 																																																								
68 UNC, art 39; David Wippman, ‘Pro-democratic Intervention’ in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford Handbook of 
the Use of Force in International Law (OUP 2015) 803. 
69 ibid. 
70 UNSC Res 2337 (19 January 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2337. 
71 AFP, ‘UN unanimously backs Gambia’s new president in standoff’ Mail Online (London 19 January 2017) 
<www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-4136274/UN-vote-backing-ECOWAS-action-The-Gambia.html> 
accessed 4 July 2017. 
DOI: 10.14324/111.2052-1871.088 
 
 56 
Security Council do exist in the history of military intervention. The first ECOWAS 
intervention in Liberia had commenced without a Security Council resolution. The Security 
Council later commended the West African bloc for the restoration of peace in Liberia.72 This 
situation was repeated in 1993 when ECOWAS intervened in Sierra Leone without first 
obtaining Security Council approval. Again, the ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) intervention was commended.73  The Security Council passed a resolution 
thereafter,74 which formally ratified the ECOMOG intervention and also authorised a UN 
force, the UN Mission in Liberia (UNAMIL), to assist ECOMOG.75 However, the legal effect 
of these retroactive authorisations remains a grey area76 as the international community 
seems to be more concerned with the success of these interventions rather than their 
‘technical’ requirement.77 
In Libya v UK,78 the ICJ declined to give retroactive effect to a Security Council 
resolution.79 A resolution adopted by the Security Council after the deployment of forces 
cannot authorise that use of force as the force was used irrespective of the Council’s 
resolution. Considering that the purpose of the UN collective security system is to ensure that 
the Security Council has effective control over non-defensive use of force, it follows that 
authorisation must precede the action.80 An interpretation of the Charter which gives effect to 
the retroactive application of resolutions leaves the use of non-defensive force out of the 
effective control of the Security Council. Adopting an interpretation which requires that 
authorisation be given priorly ensures that the use of force is kept to the bare minimum and 
encourages the pacific settlement of disputes. This construction also protects the sovereignty 
of states and restricts external interference into the internal affairs of a state.81 Thus, 
Resolution 2337 cannot be relied upon as a basis for the legality of the intervention by 
ECOWAS. This resolution did not authorise the use of military force; rather, it emphasized 																																																								
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the employment of pacific means for the settlement of the crisis. Also, a strict interpretation 
of the Charter leads to the conclusion that the authorisation for an intervention must be given 
prior to the deployment of forces, rendering retroactive authorisations as illegal under that 
legal framework.  
 
E. CONSENT TO USE FORCE 
There is consensus that the prohibition on the use of force is a peremptory norm of 
international law from which states are not permitted to derogate.82 In Nicaragua, the ICJ 
upheld this position and stated that the prohibition against the use of force is ‘not only a 
principle of customary international law but also a fundamental or cardinal principle of such 
law.’83 However, the prohibition provided for in article 2(4) of the UN Charter places a state 
under the ‘dictatorial interference’ of other states.84 ECOWAS’ presence in Gambia would 
not have been dictatorial if the consent of the right state authority had been obtained, which 
in turn entails that the peremptory rule would have not been breached. There have been 
situations in the past where states have relied on consent as the basis for the use of force on 
foreign territory and these arguments have been generally accepted by the international 
community.85 France and the United Kingdom (UK), for example, have relied on consent as 
the justification for intervention in their former colonies and states generally agreed with this 
interpretation of the law.86  
Accordingly, a state’s consent to the foreign use of force in its territory is generally 
acknowledged to be permissible.87 Thus, such force would be consistent with article 2(4) of 
the Charter, insofar as it stays within the ambit of the given consent. In DRC v Uganda,88 the 
ICJ held that the use of force by Uganda in DRC territory to fight a common enemy was 																																																								
82 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 18th Session (4 May – 19 July 1966) 
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permissible if the consent of DRC was established.89 Thus, state consent is recognized under 
international law as a justification for the use of force within the territory of a sovereign 
state.90 
During his inaugural speech, Adama Barrow made a special appeal to ECOWAS, the 
AU and the UN to support the people of Gambia in enforcing their will, restoring sovereignty 
and constitutional legitimacy.91 It has been asserted that this statement by Barrow constitutes 
an invitation by Gambia and dispels the need for a Security Council approval.92 In order to 
substantiate this position, two questions must be addressed. First, does the statement, made as 
part of an inaugural speech, constitute consent? Secondly, who is the right person to consent 
to the deployment of foreign troops on behalf of the state, Adama Barrow or the erstwhile 
president, Yahya Jammeh? 
1. What is consent? 
There is no generally accepted definition of what constitutes consent and how such consent is 
to be expressed. However, it is clear that consent can be explicit or implicit as long as it is 
clearly established.93 The ICJ held in DRC v Uganda that for a statement to constitute valid 
consent, it must be clear and express.94 Barrow’s statement asking for support from the 
international community did not contain an express plea for military intervention. However, 
his use of the word ‘enforce’ seems to have the implication that he was requesting various 
forms of support including military if necessary. In DRC v Uganda, the ICJ held that a 
statement to ‘cooperate in order to insure security and peace along the common border’ 
constituted consent to use force even though the words ‘force’ or ‘military’ were not used.95 
There also seems to be an understanding among stakeholders in the events leading to the 
inauguration of Barrow as President that the use of armed forces may become necessary, 
especially after the state of emergency was declared by Yahya Jammeh. It is thus reasonable 
to state that Adama Barrow had military force in contemplation when seeking for 
international support during his inauguration. 
2. Who is the right authority to consent? 																																																								
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The next question is whether Adama Barrow is the right authority to give consent on behalf 
of Gambia. Generally, international law recognizes the government in effective control of the 
whole or substantial part of the territory as the right authority to give or withhold consent to 
intervene in a state.96 A government must be effective to be recognized and this entails 
control of a substantial part of the territory, habitual obedience of the population and the 
likelihood of remaining in power.97 Intervention without the consent of a government in 
effective control is deemed illegal even if such intervention is to replace a dictator with a 
democratically elected government.98 However, state practice and opinio juris on recognition 
of governments remain inconsistent and it is difficult to draw a general conclusion on what 
precisely is needed for a government to be recognized.99  
There have been instances where states and international organizations have 
intervened based on consent given by an ousted but democratically elected government.100 
However, the governments in question were ousted governments that had previously been in 
power. Thus, they had met these criteria at some point, the only issue being that they no 
longer met them at the time of intervention. Barrow on the other hand had never been in 
power. He had never been in control of any part of the Gambian territory, nor had any duty of 
allegiance or obedience towards him arisen on the part of the Gambian populace. There is no 
precedent under international law that can be relied on for justifying the argument that his 
government, which practically did not exist at the time, could be recognized. In light of this, 
Adama Barrow was not the rightful authority to consent to the use of force in Gambian 
territory and his plea for support cannot be regarded as due consent.101  
Even if it is conceded that Barrow was the lawful authority to give such consent, the 
deployment of troops by ECOWAS would nevertheless remain illegal as ECOWAS never 
relied on Adama Barrow’s request as the ground for its deployment of troops. The ECOWAS 
deployment of force was independent of Gambian consent. ECOWAS had agreed in its 50th 
Ordinary Session on 17 December 2016 that it would take ‘all necessary measures to strictly 																																																								
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enforce the 2016 elections’ and ensure that Adama Barrow is inaugurated as President of 
Gambia.102 The decision to deploy troops had been taken a month before Barrow’s call for 
support and ECOWAS began to deploy troops at the Gambian border shortly before the 
inauguration. It is therefore untenable that ECOWAS acted based on state consent. The threat 
of force and the actual deployment of force into Gambian territory without prior Security 
Council authorisation constitute a breach of the UN Charter. This illegality would have been 
cured if the decision to deploy force and the actual deployment of force was on the basis of 
an invitation by the rightful authority of Gambia. 
3. Prior consent through treaty 
In the alternative, it could be argued that consent was not necessary as consent had been 
received a priori through regional treaties103 such as the Protocol Relating to the Mutual 
Assistance on Defence and the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security. The Protocol Relating to the Mutual 
Assistance on Defence established a multinational defence force authorised to intervene in 
armed conflict between member states and in internal armed conflicts supported actively 
from outside the state.104 However, intervention could only occur after the leader of the state 
involved had forwarded a written request to the appropriate ECOWAS authority. 105 
ECOWAS cannot intervene without such a written request. Article 18 of the Protocol 
expressly prohibits ECOWAS intervention when the conflict remains purely internal.  
The Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security also established a mechanism permitting the use of 
force within the territory of member states. However, the Protocol provided expressly for the 
circumstances during which this mechanism was to be utilized.106 With respect to democracy, 
interventions were limited to ‘the event of an overthrow or attempted overthrow of a 
democratically elected government.’107 This implies that this mechanism would only be 
deployed for a sitting government that was being overthrown and not to establish a 
democracy that had never been in power. Gambian consent to the Protocol cannot be relied 
upon as a ground for the intervention. There was no written request as provided for in the 																																																								
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Protocol Relating to the Mutual Assistance on Defence, the crisis remained a purely internal 
crisis at the time of intervention and the intervention did not regard restoring an overthrown 
government. Hence, it is clear that Gambia did not consent a priori through treaty. 
It is clear from the foregoing that there was no valid consent from Gambia, whether 
expressed through treaty or by the rightful authority after the facts had emerged, permitting 
ECOWAS to use force on Gambian territory. It is therefore necessary to examine whether the 
right to democratic governance is recognised under international law and if so, whether the 
use of force can be employed to protect this right. The following section will assess whether 
democratic governance has become a norm of general international law.  
 
F. THE RIGHT TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 
Despite the clear illegality of the ECOWAS deployment of force in Gambia, this action has 
received very little condemnation. Does this imply that the right to democratic governance 
and the use of force for its enforcement, even without a Security Council resolution, has 
become fully entrenched under customary international law?  
Debates around pro-democratic intervention became popular during the post-Cold 
War era. These came as offshoots of the arguments by the United States (‘US’) and the UK 
on the need to bring ‘democracy and freedom’ to Iraq and the Middle East.108 Several treaties 
and declarations at the end of the Cold War therefore reinforced the principle of democratic 
governance and made governmental legitimacy conditional upon the respect of democratic 
norms and principles.109 Regional organizations began to impose the duty to respect and 
ensure democratic principles as a condition for recognizing new states and for accepting new 
members.110 Organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(‘OSCE’) and the Organization of American States (‘OAS’) went as far as undertaking to 
defend and protect the democratic order of its members.111 The AU has also played a key role 
in maintaining democratic governance among its member states. States and various regional 
organizations have condemned coups that displace elected governments and sometimes place 
sanctions on such undemocratic regimes.112  
The effect of this is that there seems to be a growing acceptability of interventions for 
the sake of upholding democracy in a foreign state. This is especially so on the West African 																																																								
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sub-region where the success of pro-democratic interventions has been frequent. ECOWAS 
has over the years committed itself to opposing unconstitutional governments through the 
employment of force. In 1998, ECOWAS helped to reinstate the democratically elected 
government of Sierra Leone which had been ousted by military officers. Despite the fact that 
this intervention was without Security Council approval, it was neither condemned by the 
Security Council or by any state within the international community. Instead, the Security 
Council lauded ECOWAS on its role in ensuring stability.113 The only state that raised 
concerns as to the legality of this action was Russia which insisted that such actions should 
only be taken with prior Security Council authorisation.114 ECOWAS has also intervened in 
Cote d’Ivoire and the Central African Republic without prior Security Council approval and 
these interventions have been met little criticism.  
However, opinio juris on the legal effect of this practice is not uniform. In the 
Liberian crisis, the US maintained that the crisis was an internal one that should be resolved 
by Liberians.115 And even though the UN had passed a resolution sanctioning the RUF 
junta,116 it refused to authorise military intervention. It was this refusal that created the gap 
which caused ECOWAS to deploy military action.117 Similarly in the Sierra Leone case 
explained above, the intervention was based on the consent of an extant government. 
In his arguments in support of pro-democratic interventions, Reisman stated that the 
prohibition on the use of force provided for in article 2(4) of the UN Charter is predicated on 
a system of collective security.118 Reisman argues that given the ineffectiveness of the 
collective security system under the UN Charter, the prohibition on unilateral use of force 
should now be differently construed.119 According to Reisman, states should engage in the 
use of force as a result of compelling moral situations. Further, rather than forbid all forms of 
use of force, the determination of which uses of force are to be allowed should be made on a 
case by case basis.120 That determination hinges on two criteria, argues Reisman: Firstly, the 
use of force in question must contribute to or enhance the maintenance of world order.121 																																																								
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Secondly, the action must be politically legitimate in terms of enhancing the rights of people 
to determine their own political destinies.122 According to him, every application of article 
2(4) must enhance the right of peoples’ self-determination and the analysis of whether use of 
force is consistent with that provision must always pay due regard for this underlying 
principle.123  
Similarly, Franck argues in support of the emerging right to democratic 
governance.124 Franck, relying on events in Russia and Haiti notes that the international 
community had upheld the notion that democracy validates governance and the legitimacy of 
governments had come within the purview of international law.125 Franck however accepted 
that this rule was yet to be fully established in international law, but asserted that it was 
definitely emerging and citizens could now look to the international community for the 
protection of their democratic entitlement.126 He argued that where there was a violation of 
such a democratic right or a refusal to permit free and fair elections or to respect the outcome 
of such elections, there should be consequences ranging from sanctions and blockades to 
military intervention, where necessary. However, these consequences were to be imposed 
collectively rather than unilaterally.127 Teson, another leading scholar, has suggested that 
force used for restoring democracy does not engage the prohibition contained in the UN 
Charter.128 Given the purposes of the UN, argues Teson, it would be permissible to use force 
for deposing a despotic regime.129 Generally, these authors rely on a purposive interpretation 
of the UN Charter and hold that pro-democratic interventions help to further achieve the 
purpose and objectives of the UN Charter.130 They contend that the Charter prohibition was 
established to protect political independence and territorial integrity of states and an that 
interventions which do not affect any of these objectives is thus permissible under the that 
legal framework.131  
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The right of members of a state to determine their governance and political system is 
a basic principle recognised under international law. This right includes the freedom of 
competing groups to disagree and fight or to revolt against their government.132 Therefore, 
armed interference by a foreign (or regional) actor in this political process deprives the 
people of the right to decide and conclude their political process by themselves.133 As stated 
by the ICJ in its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons, 
political matters remain within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. The use of force for 
democratic intervention thus constitutes ‘a use of force against the political independence…’ 
of a state and hence, a clear breach of article 2(4).134  
The establishment of exceptions to the prohibition of use of force beyond the clear 
wording of the Charter would lead to a ‘legion of loopholes’ and would expose the Charter to 
abuse and derogations.135 Any loosening of the interpretation of the prohibition against the 
use of force has the potential to create a situation where the norm gives room for so many 
exceptions that the rule is a result deprived of any effective application.136 Louis Henkins has 
noted that even humanitarian intervention could become a pretext for aggression.137 Although 
Reisman provides two criteria for the determination of a pro-democratic intervention, these 
criteria are insufficient to prevent abuse. Who decides that these criteria have been met and 
upon what legal basis does such an authority make this decision? Moreover, the criteria are 
highly normative and cannot be measured or assessed in concrete terms. With regards to the 
maintenance of world order for example, how does one determine the level of intensity which 
an internal crisis must have for it to affect world order? These criteria therefore become 
unhelpful in deciding when a state or regional organization may intervene. 
International law evolves through state consent whether through treaties or state 
practice.138 The actions of states are restricted by free will expressed through treaties, 
agreements or ‘usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law’.139 Changes to the 
international legal order cannot be assumed where such changes are not established in a 
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treaty or custom.140 In this case, there is no treaty law which supports or affirms the legality 
of pro-democratic intervention. While there seem to be a number of cases where pro-
democratic interventions have been carried out, it remains insufficient to reach a positive 
conclusion regarding the opinio juris element of customary rules as positions are widely 
divided.141 Such interventions remain a violation of the extant law on the use of force.142  
 
G. THE LEGITIMACY OF PRO-DEMOCRATIC INTERVENTIONS 
1. Illegal but legitimate: moral considerations in the assessment of international 
conducts 
The former Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan asked the now popular question: ‘…if 
humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we 
respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights 
that affect every precept of our common humanity?’143 Although Kofi Annan spoke about 
humanitarian intervention, this question could also be applied to the discussions on pro-
democratic intervention, especially when one takes into account the violence that often 
accompanies political crises and how it can quickly lead to the breach of the people’s human 
rights.  Should violations of people’s political rights be overlooked in favour of the protection 
of state sovereignty and political independence?  
State practice reveals that there is an inclination within the international community to 
answer this question in the negative. There have been a number of interventions, especially in 
the West African sub-region, which were largely condoned despite the fact that these 
interventions were in breach of international law.144 There is an acknowledgement that 
certain circumstances would give room for an unavoidable breach of the law in order to 
protect the members of a state. Such necessity for action and the danger of failure to act is 
exemplified in the Rwandan genocide of 1994. The genocide had started as an internal crisis 
between the Hutus and Tutsis of Rwanda and eventually led to the death of about a million 
Rwandans.145 Even though many have condemned the failure of the international community 
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to act,146 there was indeed no legal duty incumbent on the international community to take 
military action in Rwanda.147 If anything, the international community had stayed within 
bounds of the legal requirement prohibiting interference in the political independence and 
territorial integrity of a state. Despite the illegality or otherwise of the conduct, there is 
consensus that the international community should have acted. A timely intervention would 
arguably have helped to save the lives that were lost. It therefore becomes imperative that 
there are situations where intervention, though illegal, would be welcome or better put, 
legitimate.  
Common sense of justice and morality may require that states act outside the strict 
provisions of the law in order to ensure a just outcome in a given situation.148 Thomas Franck 
explains this with an illustration of two boys whose fathers had a fight. The father of one of 
the boys consequently instructed his son to ‘never to have anything to do’ with the other boy. 
On the next day, this boy saw his friend who could not swim drowning and decided to help 
him. This was obviously contrary to his father’s instruction but his action was definitely 
justifiable and punishing him for rescuing the boy would be ‘morally wrong’.149 Legitimacy, 
as used here, refers to moral or philosophical standards of higher status upon which the 
validity or acceptability of an act or exercise of power is judged.150 In other words, an act 
would be legitimate if it is supported by a higher normative standard. Even if illegal, an act 
which ensures justice in a given situation would be regarded as legitimate.  
The assessment of legitimacy focuses on the desired outcome of a conduct as 
compared with the result of a refusal to act or to take some other course of action. This 
framework of analysis looks beyond the law to assess if there are other factors which would 
compel action in a manner inconsistent with the law, if compliance with the law would lead 
to situations that are humanly unjustifiable. In reaching the conclusion that NATO 
intervention in Kosovo was legitimate, the Kosovo Commission reached the conclusion that 
the intervention was legitimate due to the fact that ‘the intervention had the effect of 
liberating the majority [of the] population of Kosovo.’151 The focus was on the impact of the 
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intervention on Kosovars.152 And it was held as legitimate because it helped to protect the 
people who would otherwise be subject to further abuse of their rights.153 It is therefore 
necessary to assess the ECOWAS intervention in light of some other principle or set of 
principles outside the strict interpretation of the law. 
2. Legitimacy of the ECOWAS intervention in Gambia 
The principles underpinning human rights, as well as the principles of justice and morality 
offer a basis for arguing for the legitimacy of the ECOWAS intervention in Gambia. 
ECOWAS intervened on behalf of the people who exercised their right to self-
determination. 154  Self-determination entails the right of members of a state to freely 
determine their political status.155 Civil and political rights constitute one of the generations 
of human rights recognized under international law.156 This class of rights provides that a 
person shall be free to participate in the civil and political life of his society without 
discrimination or repression.157 The people of Gambia exercised this right via the polls and 
chose Adama Barrow as their president. Jammeh on the other hand refused to yield to the 
mandate of the people and insisted on staying in power. Even though international law 
recognises the right to self-determination, there is no consensus on the use of force as a 
means to ensure that right vis-à-vis foreign states, save for events where the Security Council 
has authorised this in the exercise of its Chapter VII authority. Nevertheless, ECOWAS 
intervened. 
The legitimacy of this intervention can be justified upon the philosophical 
underpinnings of the legal principles and rules dealing with human rights. These principles 
are founded on basic morality and justice.158 This morality is an intrinsic attribute of 
mankind, and possesses an inherent significance which human beings, irrespective of where 
they are, cannot alter.159 Gross human rights violations in any part of the world shock the 
conscience of all mankind and it is the duty of each state to protect the rights of everyone 
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under its jurisdiction.160 However, when a state becomes unwilling to protect the rights of 
those under its jurisdiction, the international community should be willing to rescue the 
members of such a state.161  
This reasoning was first developed by Grotius, a seventeenth century jurist who 
propounded the notion of a societas humana – the universal community of humankind. 162 
This universality implies a moral duty to help others outside a state’s immediate 
jurisdiction.163 He stated that when a prince inflicts tyranny on his subjects, other states are 
justified to intervene against such a state.164 The community of states cannot sit back and 
allow the rights of several thousands and perhaps millions of people be trampled upon by 
authoritarian regimes. As a former Secretary-General of the UN put it, ‘it would be neither 
sound morality, nor wise policy…’165 When the law permits the perpetuation of conduct that 
is unfair or unjust, actions must be taken and such actions need not wait for a Security 
Council resolution or ‘pictures of unfolding atrocities that shock the conscience of the 
world.’166 This moral duty is the most basic ground within this common morality for 
interference in the internal affairs of one nation by outsiders including international bodies.167 
This normative ground, continues Grotius, exists and will justify the unlawful use of force in 
extreme situations.168  
The need for a common front in the protection of human rights was stressed by the 
ICJ when stating that what is of paramount importance in such situations is the acceptance of 
common obligations in order to achieve a high objective for all humanity.169 During these 
situations, legal concepts often serve as instruments in defence of the oppressor and not the 
people of the states involved. The welfare and the security of rights for individuals must 
therefore be placed above the legal concepts of sovereignty and non-intervention.  
The justification for the ECOWAS intervention in Gambia lies in the fact that the 
right to self-determination was protected by the intervention. Furthermore, there had been 																																																								
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widespread allegations against the Jammeh-led government including human rights abuses,170 
stifling of political opposition, and death in custody.171 The situation of things in Gambia had 
become heightened after the election period showing that a humanitarian catastrophe was 
looming.172 As proof of the sense of insecurity and instability in Gambia, many had begun to 
migrate into the territory of neighbouring Senegal.173 As at the time of intervention, a 
humanitarian catastrophe was underway and it took the ECOWAS intervention to forestall 
the humanitarian crisis that could have ensued. The aversion of this crisis is a more legitimate 
objective to pursue than insisting on legal concepts that would have created a leeway for 
continued abuse by the Jammeh-led regime. 
In conclusion, the norms of international law providing for non-interference in the 
internal affairs of a state and prohibiting the use of non-defensive force remain valid and 
should generally be respected. 174  However, there are situations in which states or 
international organizations may feel morally compelled to intervene in a state in order to 
uphold morality and justice. Gambia was one of such cases. There had been widespread 
allegations of human rights abuses in the twenty-two year-old regime of Yahya Jammeh and 
his refusal to step down upon losing the 2016 elections was pointer to this intention to hold 
on to power indefinitely. The winner of the elections, Adama Barrow was also not willing to 
bow to the tyranny of Jammeh and the catastrophe that could have emerged in the next 
months, had ECOWAS not intervened, is better imagined than experienced. The ECOWAS 
intervention was legitimate as it helped to prevent the democratic and political crisis of 
Gambia from escalating to a full human rights and international crisis. 
 
H. CONCLUSION 
This article traces the facts of the political crisis that emerged in Gambia in 2016 which 
climaxed in the deployment of ECOWAS troops and the exile of the erstwhile president, 																																																								
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Yahya Jammeh, in January 2017. The UN Charter is clear on its prohibition of the use of 
force as an instrument of international relations. The Charter only allows force for the 
purpose of individual or collective self-defence. Every other use of force must be pursuant to 
a Security Council authorization in exercise of its Chapter VII powers to maintain 
international peace and security. The ECOWAS intervention in Gambia was neither in self-
defence nor pursuant to a Security Council resolution. The intervention was already 
underway before Resolution 2337 was passed by the Council and the resolution was silent on 
the use of military force against Gambia; instead, it emphasized pacific means for the 
settlement of the dispute.  
While consent is recognized under international law as rendering permissible the use 
of force on a foreign territory, Barrow’s plea for support at his inauguration did not constitute 
a valid invitation for ECOWAS to use force on the Gambian territory. Furthermore, Barrow 
had no authority to approve the use of force at the relevant time. The general rule is to 
recognize the person in effective control as the right authority to grant consent for 
intervention. Barrow was definitely not in control of Gambia at the time of intervention. 
Besides, the ECOWAS intervention would have gone ahead irrespective of Barrow’s speech 
as the deployment of troops had already begun before his inauguration. 
The deployment of troops would have been permissible if the legality of pro-
democratic intervention was an established principle under international law. However, the 
right of states to use force against each other for the promotion or establishment of 
governmental legitimacy is not firmly established in international law. The right to 
democratic governance is not supported by the legality of pro-democratic interventions. It 
would therefore be impossible to rely on the existence of a right to pro-democratic 
intervention as the basis for the ECOWAS intervention in Gambia. 
The ECOWAS intervention in Gambia is undoubtedly illegal: there is no treaty or 
customary international law which permits this intervention. However, the restoration of 
stability in Gambia by ECOWAS is worthy of commendation. The positive impact and 
timeliness of the intervention cannot be overlooked. ECOWAS helped to prevent what may 
have developed into a civil war in the small West African state. The international community 
has largely embraced the intervention and perhaps it is time to ask again if there should an 
emerging right of democratic intervention.  
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